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A New Analytical Approach to Evaluate the
Critical-Event Probability Due to Wireless
Communication Errors in Train Control Systems
Khanh T. P. Nguyen, Julie Beugin, Marion Berbineau, and Mohamed Kassab
Abstract—Wireless communication links tend to be employed
more and more in safety-critical railway applications. Their safe
use in an advanced train control system (TCS) is an issue that is
addressed in this paper by characterizing the TCS service inter-
ruption due to communication errors. More precisely, occurrence
probabilities of single errors are first discussed. Then, we obtain
probabilistic analytical expressions of several temporal conditions
that lead to a TCS service interruption, here a train emergency
braking (the critical event). The accuracy of this analytical ap-
proach is proved when the results are compared with those given
by a simulation approach with a Petri net model. Additionally, as
the use case related to the “trains’ separation” is considered in this
paper, an analytical evaluation process is proposed to discuss the
tolerated time margins that can be fixed to limit the critical-event
occurrence probability due to the wireless communication errors.
Index Terms—Rail transportation communication, rail trans-
portation reliability, probabilistic model, intelligent transporta-
tion systems, wireless communication errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
TRAIN control systems (TCS) are relying more and moreon wireless communication systems (WCS) [1] as they
improve train operations, especially by offering continuous
communications between embedded and ground installations.
Today, the European Train Control System (ETCS) Level
2 used for mainlines and high speed, relies on continuous
exchanges via wireless cellular network known as Global
System for Mobile Communications Railway (GSM-R).
Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) systems used for
mass transit lines, rely on wireless local area network (WLAN),
IEEE 802.11x standards. In the future, among new wireless
technologies, the Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology is
considered as one of the promising solutions to satisfy the need
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to develop numerous intelligent and safe train control appli-
cations additionally to the TCS one (e.g., DAVS-Driver Assist
Video System) [2]. Indeed, its architecture supports multiser-
vice traffic and is also much less vulnerable to security threats
than other wireless technologies [3]. For TCS, LTE makes
possible the convergence of ETCS and CBTC systems in a
unique system combining all features [4]. Besides the operation
reliability and safety, the passenger comfort is also addressed by
employing social network services for rail traffic applications
[5]. Therefore, WCS for future railways is required to evolve
from voice and signaling services to multiservice of high data
rates [6]. This integration has to be realized by maintaining the
current safety conditions provided today by existing TCS. This
issue is addressed in this article by analyzing the impact of
wireless communication errors on the TCS service interruption.
In the literature, the close relationship between WCS and
TCS is generally approached in three ways. The first way, from
the automation engineering domain, considers the impact of the
WCS performances on the train traffic flow. It is based on the
assumptions that performance parameters of the WCS are
known and modeled by stochastic or probabilistic variables.
In [7], the authors proposed a cellular automata model to
investigate the impact of end-to-end communication delay on
railway traffic flow. [8] studied the impact of random packet
drops due to the frame error rate (FER) and handovers on the
stability and performances of CBTC systems.
Unlike the first way that simplifies the WCS modeling, the
second way focuses on the performance of the WCS with
their close-to-reality-models in train control applications. In
this context, the WCS performance issue takes even greater im-
portance and is considered from the telecommunication expert’s
point of view while the train control modeling is simplified.
Using Colored Petri Nets (CPN), the authors in [9] focused on
modeling the WCS of the CBTC system in order to evaluate
the transfer delay of messages between the trains and the zone
controller (ZC). In [10], using OPNET (Optimized Network
Engineering Tool) simulations, the authors proved that QoS
(Quality of Service) mechanisms of a deployed LTE network
are efficient enough for ensuring simultaneously safety and
non-safety applications in ETCS. In [11], the authors also used
the OPNET simulator to evaluate the performances offered by
the LTE system to safety and non-safety applications in urban
guided-transport. In [12], the authors derived the stochastic
delay thresholds of high speed train control services over fad-
ing channels using the analytical analysis based on stochastic
network calculus.
On the other hand, numerous studies aimed to proposed an
efficient solution to limit the negative impact such as ping-pong
effect, handover delay, packet loss on the performance of TCS.
The paper [13] presented a handoff algorithm with frequency
combination that allows for ensuring the channel quality and
optimize handoff time. In order to reduce the handover delay,
the multiple-input-multiple output (MIMO) assisted handoff
scheme is proposed for CBTC system basedWLAN technology
[14] and for the one based on LTE technology [15]. The authors
in [16] proposed using cooperative relaying for train-train com-
munication in order to enhance the train control performance of
CBTC systems.
The third way considers theWCS performances from railway
operator’s point of view and addresses the question whether
the WCS ensures the desired performance level for safety
application according to the railway safety standards [17]. In
this context, a single communication error can be negligible.
Only communication errors that last more than a certain time
and that can lead to a critical event (CE) like a collision are in-
teresting. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the WCS model’s
complexity of the second way when focusing on the railway
safety and operation aspects by neglecting WCS details such as
fading channel effects, resource allocation, power control, etc.
However, the WCS modeling in this third way is more aided
than in the first way by taking into account numerous channel
features such as transfer delay, loss connection rate, reconnec-
tion procedure, handover occurrence rate, handover execution
time, etc. The authors in [18] presented a stochastic Petri net
(SPN) model for ETCS real-time communication system in
order to investigate the impact of train head-to-head distance
on the train stopping probability. The proposed discrete event
model corresponds to a simplified model of transmission error
and recover behavior of the real-time WCS of the ETCS.
In [19], authors used stochastic automation networks to model
CBTC systems in order to examine the impact of the time
interval between two consecutive trains on the probability to
trigger the emergency braking of the train behind. A SPN
simulation-based approach for the dependability analysis of an
LTE-based WCS in CBTC application is presented in [20].
Nevertheless, the efficiency of these above articles, which are
based on modeling and simulations, i.e., the ratio between the
result accuracy and the execution time, is an issue. Therefore,
an analytical treatment is recommended.
The authors in [21] presented an analytical estimation for
evaluating the probability of train emergency stopping due to
Global System for Mobile Communications Railway (GSM-R)
communication errors in ETCS. The communication delays
were analyzed in more details in [22]. However, these two
studies are only based on the bit error rate (BER) analysis.
This value does not take into account any perturbing effects
caused by interferences or cell handovers as presented in [23].
In addition, these studies only consider the occurrence rate of
communication errors during a long operating time but do not
consider the duration of errors. For a TCS, the duration of
communication errors is essential in terms of safety because
a CE (an emergency braking for example) can occur when
consecutive messages are missed for more than a fixed time
interval. In [24], a new analytical analysis that examines the
duration of every principal error types of the WCS, was pro-
posed. Based on the previous work, we develop an analytical
process in this paper. This allows us to analyze the impact of
wireless communication errors on the TCS and then to eval-
uate the occurrence probability of the CE in braking control
applications. The contribution of this paper is to develop a
methodology from the railway operator’s point of view that
allows us (1) to analyze and to evaluate communication errors
that lead to the CE when no valid position message is received
by the train control center (TCC) for more than a certain
time, and (2) to calculate the occurrence probability of this
CE. This methodology could be applied in general to different
communication technologies, such as GSM-R, WLAN, or LTE
by considering the corresponding transmission procedure and
appropriate parameters.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II, we will
describe the problem statement and formalize the performance
parameters of the WCS. The proposed analytical approach
that integrates the principal communication errors degrading
CBTC services, will be presented in Section III. Then, the
case study dedicated to LTE technology, its modeling and the
model simulations are summarized in Section IV. An evaluation
process based on the analytical approach will be proposed in
Section IV-C. The process accuracy will also be proved by
comparing its results with those of a simulated PN model in
this subsection. Finally, Section V will present the conclusions
and the further research works.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MODEL FORMULATION
A. Requirements of Train Ground Communication for TCS
Focusing on railway control commands, the expected re-
quirements for a WCS are categorized into two groups accord-
ing to following applications:
1) High-speed railway applications: In Europe, the require-
ments for a WCS linked to ERTMS are defined in
numerous documents (e.g., [25]1).
2) Urban guided transport applications: The standard IEEE
1474 provides operational and safety requirements of
CBTC and mentions general requirements of perfor-
mance data related to a communication system. However,
these requirements could not be directly applied for con-
struction of communication system. To our knowledge,
each transport operator group defines its own needs for a
specific project in order to design a corresponding WCS,
as was done in Systuf.2
A summary of the requirements of train ground communi-
cation for TCS is outside the scope of this paper because in
case of (1), the requirements (qualitative and quantitative) are
numerous and in case of (2), the requirements are specific to
every operator group and in most cases are non-public.
1Note that the requirements defined in this document are not fixed and
will evolve according to technology evolution (this is written on the European
Railway Agency website at http://www.era.europa.eu/Core-Activities/ERTMS/
Pages/The-Program-Evolution-of-Railway-Radio.aspx.
2http://systuf.ifsttar.fr/index-en.php
B. Problem Statement
Let us consider an urban railway line equipped with an
advanced TCS and assume that train 1 runs ahead of train 2.
Let Tm(s) be the journey time of trains. During a journey, the
position/integrity messages generated by the trains are trans-
mitted periodically to the TTC each Ts (s). When receiving the
position message of train 2, the TCC takes into account the po-
sition of train 1 and the signaling states of other trains, and then,
sends back a movement authority message (MA) to train 2.
A message is considered valid at the reception if and only if
its transmission time does not exceed a value To (obsolescence
deadline for a message). To ensure safety conditions when no
valid position message from train 1 is received by TCC within
a period of Tb (s), an emergency braking message is sent from
the TCC to train 2. It corresponds to a CE that is relevant for
safety and dependability evaluations. In order to evaluate the
occurrence probability of this CE due to the communication
errors during a train journey, the performance parameters of
the LTE communication process between the train and the TCC
will be examined in next subsections.
C. Performance Parameters of the Communication Process
Between the Train and the TCC
1) Transmission Delay: LetDp be the transmission delay of
the packet sent by a train or by a TCC in the normal case. Dp is
assumed to follow the exponential distribution with the mean
value λp. Although this assumption seems to be too simple
to take into account the up bound values of the packet delay,
it is still widely used in communication systems, especially
in the queuing theory. In fact, according to [26] (pp. 44–45),
the assumption of exponential distribution for network delays
is adequate for a number of experimental observations and
applications. Then, the probability density function (pdf) ofDp
is given by:
fDp(t) = λp exp(−λpt). (1)
2) Retransmission Mechanism: The goal of this paper is to
propose a new methodology that could be applied in multiple
different communication technologies. Therefore, we present
in this section a general retransmission mechanism. When a
message is sent, nr copies are created. If the transmitter (Tx) re-
ceives ACK sent by the receiver (Rx), these copies are deleted,
for example, see Fig. 1.1) when Tx receives ACK from Rx.
Next, for the message 2, see Fig. 1.2), after the retransmission
time, TRE , if Tx does not yet receive ACK, it send another copy
until all nr copies are sent. For GSM-R and WILAN, nr = 0
when we do not consider the retransmission mechanism. For
LTE, we consider the Sync HARQ with nr = 3. Due to tem-
porarily bad radio signal conditions, the packet loss occurs with
rate pET . The obsolescence deadline To includes the nr + 1
versions of a message (1 original version and nr copies). For
example, see Fig. 1.2), Rx does not receive the original version
and two first copies of message 2 due to packet loss errors. Next,
the third copy arrives at Rx after the obsolescence deadline To
(counted from the first sending time of the message 2), then it
Fig. 1. Examples for the transmission and retransmission mechanisms.
is considered as an obsolescent message and does not valid for
train control application.
3) Connection Loss: Let Dl be the time to the connection
loss, in other words, the on-time duration of connection, and
let Drc be the reconnection time. Dl is assumed to follow the
exponential distribution, [18]:
fDl(t) = λl exp(−λlt). (2)
The train hardware detects this state after some time-out,
Td and tries to establish a new connection with the failed
reconnection probability pf . In detail, when the reconnection
duration is greater than b, the re-establishment is considered
as false and then another attempt is made, [18]. The recovery
time of a successful connection is assumed to follow the
uniform distribution of UNIF[a, b]. Thus, for h reconnection
with h ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∞}, the probability density function of the
reconnection time is given by:
fDrc(t) =


0 t ≤ a
(1− pf ) 1b−a t ∈]a, b]
. . .
0 t ∈](h− 1)b, (h− 1)b+ a]
(1− pf )p(h−1)f
1
b−a
t ∈](h− 1)b+ a, hb].
(3)
If the connection is established at the first attempt, h = 1,
then the reconnection time, Drc, belongs to the interval [a, b].
The probability that the connection is successful at the first
attempt is 1− pf . Therefore, the probability density function
of the reconnection time is given by fDrc = 0 for t ≤ a and
fDrc = (1− pf)/(b− a) for t ∈]a, b]. Next, the probability
that the first attempt of reconnection is failed and the second
reconnection is successful (h = 2) is (1− pf )pf . In this case,
the reconnection time Drc, only belongs to the interval ]b+
a, 2b]. Similarly, if the (h− 1)-th attempts are failed and the
h-th reconnection is successful, the reconnection timeDrc only
belongs to the interval ](h− 1)b+ a, hb].
4) Handover Performance: Handover processes occur every
time the train crosses the limit between the communication
areas of two neighboring radio base stations (called eNodeB
in an LTE network). When the train is operating normally, the
inter-occurrence time of handovers can be associated with one
of the two assumptions that follow:
• either it can be considered as a constant, THo (s). Then,
the distribution of time Dk when handover occurs for the
k-th time is:
FDk(t) = δ{t≥kTHo} (4)
where δ{condition} = 1 when the condition is true and
δ{condition} = 0 when the condition is false.
• or it can be considered as independent and exponentially
distributed with the rate λHo [18]. Then, the distribution
of the time Tk when handover occurs for the k-th time
follows the Gamma law:
FDk(t) = 1−
k−1∑
j=0
(λHot)
j
j!
exp(−λHot). (5)
The execution time of handovers is assumed to follow the
exponential distribution with the rate λeH , [18]. Let DeH be
the handover delay, then its pdf is:
fDeH (t) = λeH exp(−λeH t). (6)
When the packet is sent during the handover processes, its
transmission delay is defined by DeH +Dp.
III. ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPAL TYPES OF COMMUNICATION
ERRORS IN THE TCS
For the advanced TCS, a single communication error (such as
losing one packet) can be negligible. The communication error
becomes important when a fixed time interval is exceeded. In
other words, missing consecutive valid messages at the train or
the TCC will lead to CE. Therefore, in this section, we will
analyze the principal types of communication errors that can
lead to missing consecutive valid messages at the receiver. In
general, these errors are classified by the following types:
• Type A—loss of n consecutive messages in normal con-
dition (without a handover process or a connection loss)
where n is the minimum number of invalid messages that
can lead to the CE.
• Type B—long execution time of handovers during more
than T1 s where T1 is the minimal duration of errors that
can lead to the CE.
• Type C—long timeout of connection during more than
T1 (s).
• Hybrid type, i.e., the combination between the above
types. The higher the combination order between error
types is, the lower the occurrence probability of this event
is. Then only the combination of order 2 (i.e., combination
between 2 error types) is considered in this paper:
1) combination between packet losses and a handover.
2) combination between packet losses and a connection
loss.
3) combination between a handover and a connection
loss.
Fig. 2. Time chart of the occurrence of error Type A.
Because of the complexity, the analytical analysis for the hybrid
error types is not presented in this section. It will be approxi-
mated for a particular case study in Section IV. The value of n,
T1 will also be investigated in Section IV-C.
A. Occurrence Probability of Error Type A
In this paragraph, the mathematical formulation of the prob-
ability that n consecutive valid messages cannot arrive at the
receiver during normal connectionwill be derived.As presented
in the above section, a message is considered as failed when
the nr + 1 packets of the retransmission mechanism are failed.
In fact, during normal connection period (without connection
loss or handover procedure), the packet error at the reception is
caused by:
• the packet error rate, pET .
• the packet obsolescence: transmission time is more than
the obsolescence deadline, To.
Then, the probability that the i-th packet transmission is incor-
rect is given by:
pi = pET + P (Dp ≥ To − (i − 1)TRE) . (7)
As the errors of packet transmission during normal connection
are independent, the probability that a message transmission is
failed, pm, is given by:
pm =
nr+1∏
i=1
[pET + P (Dp ≥ To − (i− 1)TRE)] . (8)
LetQi be the probability that error type A occurs for the first
time at the i-th message sending. It is easy to see that: Qi = 0
for i < n and the probability that error type A occurs at the n-th
message sending, Fig. 2(a) is: Qn = pnm.
Then, the probability that error type A occurs for the first
time at the (n+ h)-th message sending is: Qn+h = (1−
pm)p
n
m for 0 < h ≤ n. Indeed, we find that error type A occurs
for the first time at the (n+ h)-th message sending (0 < h ≤
n) if the h-th message is valid at the receiver and then, n next
consecutive messages are failed, for example, h = 1, Fig. 2(b).
Next, considering Fig. 2(c), error type A occurs for the first
time at the (2n+ 1)-th message sending if:
• the train receives the (n+ 1)-th message, then it does not
receive n next consecutive messages.
• and error type A does not occur for the first time at the
n-th message sending.
Q2n+1 = (1 − pm)pnm(1−Qn).
Similarly, we have:
Q2n+2 = (1− pm)pnm
(
1−
n+1∑
h=n
Qh
)
.
In summary, the probability that error type A occurs for the first
time at the i-th message sending is given by:
Qi =


0 i < n
pnm i = n
(1− pm)pnm n < i ≤ 2n
(1− pm)pnm
(
1−
∑i−n−1
h=n Qh
)
i ≥ 2n+ 1.
(9)
Therefore, we obtain the following property:
Property 1: Let Nm(t) be the number of train messages that
are sent during [0, t], t > Ts,Nm(t) = int[t/Ts]where int[x] is
the integer part of x; and letDA be the occurrence time of error
type A. The probability that error type A occurs during [0, t] can
be calculated by:
P(DA ≤ t) =
Nm(t)∑
i=n
Qi (10)
where Qi is defined by the (9).
B. Distribution Function of Error Type B
Error type B can only occur during handover process. LetDB
be the first time occurrence of error type B then DB is always
greater than T1. It is easy to see that:
P(DB ≤ t) = 0 ∀t < T1.
It remains to calculate FB(t) = P(DB ≤ t) for t ≥ T1. As
the occurrence times of handover are totally independent of
the time when the previous handover process finishes, the
probability that error type B occurs for the first time during the
k-th handover process at t is:
FBk(t) = P (Dk + T1 ≤ t,DeH1 < T1, . . .
. . . , DeHk−1 < T1, DeHk ≥ T1
)
where Dk is the k-th occurrence time of handover process,
defined by (4) or (5); DeHk is the execution time of the k-th
handover, defined by (6). As the occurrence times of handover
and their relevant execution times are independent, the FBk(t)
can be rewritten as:
FBk(t) = P(Dk ≤ t− T1)(1− e−λeHT1)
(k−1)
e−λeHT1 . (11)
Finally, we obtain the following property.
Property 2: The probability that at t, t > T1, the handover
execution time is more than a certain time, T1 (s), which is the
distribution function of error type B, is given by:
FB(t) =
∞∑
k=1
P(Dk≤ t−T1)(1−e−λeHT1)
(k−1)
e−λeHT1 (12)
where P(Dk ≤ t− T1) is calculated by (4) or (5).
C. Distribution Function of Error Type C
Recall that:
• Dl1 , . . . , Dlk are i.i.d. following (E(λl)), they are the
durations associated to connection losses.
• Doc1 , . . . , Dock are the out-time durations of connection
where Dock = Drck + Td given that Drck are i.i.d. fol-
lowing (fDrc(t)) and is the time to reconnection and that
Td is the time to detect the timeout.
(Dlk)k≥1 and (Drck)k≥1 are independent.
Let DC be the first time occurrence of error type C. Similarly
to case B, we have: P(DC ≤ t) = 0, ∀t < T1 and it remains to
calculate:
FC(t) = P(DC ≤ t) for t ≥ T1.
If Dock is the first out-time duration which is longer than T1
then:
DC=(Dl1+Doc1)+ · · ·+
(
Dlk−1+Dock−1
)
+Dlk+T1. (13)
The probability that error type C occurs at t is given by:
FC(t) =
∞∑
k=1
FCk(t)
where
FCk(t)=P
(
DC≤ t,Doc1 <T1, . . . , Dock−1<T1, Dock≥T1
)
.
Because (Dlk)k≥1 are i.i.d. with exponential distribution fol-
lowing E(λl), the random variableDl1 + · · ·+Dlk is Gamma-
distributed with parameters (k,λl). Furthermore as (Dlk)k≥1
and (Dock)k≥1 are independent, it implies that in (13), we
can replace the sum Dl1 + · · ·+Dlk by a random variable
Wk ∼ Γ(k,λl). Hence we obtain:
FCk(t) =P
(
Wk +Doc1 + · · ·+Dock−1 + T1 ≤ t,
Doc1 < T1, . . . ., Dock−1 < T1, Dock ≥ T1
)
=E
(
FWk
(
t− T1 −
k−1∑
i=1
Doci
)
· δ{Doc1<T1}
. . . .δ{Dock−1<T1}
δ{Dock≥T1}
)
where FWk is the c.d.f. of Wk.
Property 3: The distribution function of error type C when
the time of connection is more than a certain time T1 is written
by
∑∞
k=1 FCk
FCk(t) =
T1C∫
0
. . .
T1C∫
0
FWk (·)dDrc1 . . . dDrck−1
·
∞∫
T1C
fDrc(uk)duk (14)
where fDrc(t) is defined in (3), T1C = T1 − Td, and FWk (·) =
FWk(t− T1 −
∑k−1
i=1 Doci), given that:
FWk (t) = 1−
k−1∑
j=0
(λlt)
j
j!
exp(−λlt) for t ≥ T1 + (k − 1)Td.
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND
SIMULATION APPROACH: VALIDATION ON A CASE STUDY
In the previous section, we derive three properties for eval-
uating the occurrence probabilities of the principal communi-
cation error types. In this section, using these properties, we
calculate the occurrence probability of the CE, e.g., “sending
an emergency braking message from TCC to train 2” due to
communication errors between the TCC and train 1. This is
a probability related to the Tb value mentioned in Section I.
We will firstly describe the case study in Section IV-A.
Next, the simulation approach (PN here) will be is briefly in
Section IV-B. Finally, the analytical process will be performed
(by Matlab) in order to evaluate the CE probability occurrence
in Section IV-C. We also compare the results obtained by every
step of the analytical process to the ones obtained by the PN
simulation to verify their accuracy.
Note that the mathematical formulas in Section IV-C could
be evaluated by any numerical computing environment, such
as Matlab, R, C++, etc. In this paper, we use Matlab. On the
other hand, according to standard IEC 61508-part 6 (page 76),
the PN based on Monte Carlo simulation is an efficient method
for modeling dynamic system. Therefore, we believe that a
comparison with a PN simulation tool (of GRIF platform) is
enough to highlight the performance of the proposed approach,
which is totally independent of the PN simulation. In fact,
TABLE I
INPUT PARAMETERS FOR THE CASE STUDY
Fig. 3. Distribution of eNode-B along the urban railway line.
our analytical approach is not time-consuming. It allows us to
avoid the simulation execution time and to obtain results as
good as the one of the classic PN simulation. The difference
between analytical result (AR) and simulation result (SR) is
quantitatively evaluated by the relative error, ǫr:
ǫr =
|AR − SR|
SR
. (15)
A. Description of the Case Study
Considering the train’s journey time, Tm = 3600 s (average
journey duration of urban train, [23]). Several values of Ts,
the interval time between two consecutive position message
sending of the train, are chosen in the context of CBTC systems
(in the SYSTUF project3), Ts ∈ [0.2, 0.6] s. Note that these
values are very low compared to the value of 5 s mentioned in
ETCS requirements. This is due to the continuous monitoring
requirements for the Mass Transit system—CBTC, aiming to
enforce train speed profiles, headway and dwell times, [4]. As
LTE technology is considered as the final answer-piece in the
puzzle to the convergence prospect between ETCS and CBTC
systems, our case study is dedicated to a simple example of
LTE-based TCS, and furthermore the parameter values in both
reference sections of ETCS and CBTC can be inherited, given
in Table I.
Note that the input parameters are chosen(1) based on [18],(2)
based on [9] (mean transfer delay for a message of 500 bytes
is about 5 ms),(3) based on [27],(4) based on [28] with the
assumption that the target cell is already known,(5) arbitrarily
but try to come close to reality.4 In fact, Fig. 3 presents the
considered distribution of the eNodeB along the urban railway
line. As the distance between two eNodeB is fixed and also
the relevant velocity parameters of the train are specified in
advance, then the occurrence time of the handover could be
considered as constant, THo s for a given radio planning.
3http://systuf.ifsttar.fr/index-en.php
4Project SYSTUF.
Fig. 4. PN structure for the ZC operation model.
B. Modeling and Simulation Approach Applied to the
Case Study
Petri net (PN) is a graphical and mathematical formalism for
modeling discrete event systems with time-dependent behav-
iors and is widely employed to model complex systems, [29].
Simulation of PN models is a common technique to perform
dependability assessments.
In this paper, we propose to use the PN module of the soft-
ware platform GRIF5 for evaluating the occurrence probability
of the CE. In detail, SPN with predicates and assertions are
used to model the CBTC system based on the LTE technology.
Note that in the CBTC system, the TCS is normally called
zone controller (ZC). For quantitative evaluation, a high-speed
Monte Carlo simulation engine (MOCA-RP) is used.
The CBTC system is modeled with 4 sub-nets describing:
1) handover procedure
2) re-connection procedure
3) transmission and re-transmission procedure
4) Zone controller (ZC) operation.
The sub-nets modeling procedures 1, 2, and 3 are similar to
those presented in [20]. Fig. 4 presents the sub-net for modeling
the ZC operation: “sending emergency braking message”. In
detail, after receiving a valid packet from the train, “Tr12”
is triggered and the ZC sends an ACK to the train, i.e., the
token in “packet_OK” place (num. 6) is removed and another is
created in “ZC_ACK” place (num. 12). The ACK processing of
the train is modeled in the “transmission and re-transmission”
sub-net described in [20]. Another token simultaneously comes
to the “ZC_preaction” place (num. 7). Within the deadline To
of the train message, if the ZC receives another copy of this
train message, these copies are rejected, i.e., the “rejectdouble”
transition is then triggered. When a token is created in place 58,
the timer (place 11 that validates the “Tr20” transition for the
Tb time counting) is reset. If not, after Tb s, the ZC sends an
emergency braking message to train 2 and the variable “CE” is
set to true.
5GRaphical Interface for reliability Forecasting, http://grif-workshop.com/
grif/petri-module/.
Fig. 5. Missing consecutive valid messages for more than Tb s due to commu-
nication error Type A.
C. Formulation of the Analytical Approach and Discussion of
the Accuracy of Its Results
1) Missing Consecutive Valid Messages for More Than Tb s
Due to the Communication Error Type A: In the Section III-1,
the occurrence probability of error type A (n consecutive valid
messages cannot arrive at the receiver during normal connec-
tion) was evaluated. Now, in this section we will present the
way to evaluate the occurrence probability of the CE caused
by error type A (CEA). This way depends on the relationship
between Tb (maximum accepted duration without valid position
message) and Ts (time between two position/integritymessages
generated by the train). In detail, the occurrence probability of
CEA will be evaluated in the following two cases (where n is
an integer such as n = int [Tb/Ts]):
1) Tb > nTs +To
2) Tb = nTs.
As To is very small, it is not necessary to consider the case
nTs < Tb < nTs +To. This case can be considered as the
case Tb = nTs.
In the first case whenTb > nTs +To (cf. case 1) in Fig. 5
where n = 3), theCE occurs when n consecutive messages are
invalid. In this case the pdf of the CEA is given by (9).
In the second case whenTb = nTs, the CEA will occur if:
1) n consecutive messages are invalid (similar to the first
case), or
2) only (n− 1) consecutive messages are invalid with the
condition that the transmission delay of the n-th message,
D′p, is superior to the transmission delay Dp of the
message 0. The message 0 is the last valid message that
arrives at the ZC before the missing consecutive mes-
sages, (cf. case 2) in Fig. 5 where n = 3). The probability
that D′p > Dp is calculated by:
P
(
D′p > Dp
)
=
∞∫
0
∞∫
y
fD′p(x)dx.fDp(y)dy
=
∞∫
0
exp(−2λpy)λpdy = 0.5.
Fig. 6. Occurrence probability of error Type A according to the relationship
between Tb and Ts. Note: Simul—Simulation approach; Anal—Analytical
approach. The relative error between two approaches is presented by percentage
numbers in the figure.
Then, the probability that CEA occurs for the first time at the
n-th message sending is given by:
Qn = P
(
D′p > Dp
)
· P (only (n− 1) invalid messages)
+ P (n invalid messages)
= 0.5pn−1m (1− pm) + pnm = 0.5
(
pn−1m + p
n
m
)
.
Therefore, from (9), the pdf of theCEA (missing consecutive
valid messages for more than Tb s) can be rewritten as follows:
Qi =


0 i < n
0.5
(
pn−1m + p
n
m
)
i = n
(1− pm)0.5
(
pn−1m + p
n
m
)
n < i ≤ 2n
(1− pm)0.5
(
pn−1m + p
n
m
)
×
(
1−
∑i−n−1
h=n Qh
)
i > 2n.
(16)
Fig. 6 compares the results between the analytical approach
and the simulation approach of the occurrence probability
of the CEA (presented by the vertical axis) during a train
journey when pET = 0.1, Tb = Ts + 0.1 (an example for the
case Tb > nTs +To) or Tb = 2Ts (an example for the case
Tb = nTs). We find that the results for both approaches are
almost the same. In fact, the ǫr, that is presented by percentage
number according to every value point of PCEA , is smaller than
1.3% for all cases.
Then, the analytical approach is used to consider how Tb
is chosen in order to limit the impact of error type A on the
CE during a train journey. It means that Tb is investigated
such as PCEA(1 h) ≤ 1E − 5. Table II presents the occurrence
probability of theCEA according to every value of Ts, pET , Tb.
All probability values are indicated in the second line of each
row corresponding to a value of pET . Hereunder are two
examples taken from Table II:
1) for Ts = 0.2 and pET = 0.1, the occurrence probability
of CEA can be negligible when Tb ≥ 0.7.
2) for Ts = 0.2 and pET = 0.4, the occurrence probability
of CEA can be negligible when Tb ≥ 1.3.
2) Missing Consecutive Valid Messages for More Than Tb s
Due to the Communication Error Type B: Let message 0 be the
last valid message that arrives at the ZC before the handover
TABLE II
CHOOSING Tb ACCORDING TO Ts AND pET IN ORDER
TO LIMIT THE OCCURRENCE PROBABILITY OF CEA
Fig. 7. Illustration of CEB when Tb > nTs + To.
occurrence. Similarly to the previous subsection, the occurrence
probability of the CE caused by error type B, CEB will be
evaluated in two cases.
For the first case whenTb > nTs +To (cf. the example in
Fig. 7 with n = 3), the CEB occurs at the k-th handover when
the execution time of the handover is more than T1 s. T1 is
given by:
T1 =


(n− 1)Ts + To +
(
int
[
Dk
Ts
]
+ 1
)
Ts −Dk;
when mod
(
Dk
Ts
)
> 0
(n− 1)Ts + To; when mod
(
Dk
Ts
)
= 0
(17)
where n = int [Tb/Ts], Dk is the occurrence time of the k-th
handover, mod(Dk/Ts) is the remainder when we divide Dk
by Ts.
Then, from (11), the probability of the CEB occurs for
the first time at the k-th handover when Tb > nTs +To is
given by:
P(CEBk) = δ(Dk≤t−Tb)(1 − e
−λeHT1)
(k−1)
e−λeHT1 (18)
where Dk = kTHo when the time interval THo between two
handover occurrences is assumed to be constant.
For the second case when Tb = nTs, the CEB occurs for
the first time at the k-th handover when:
1) the execution time of the handover is more than T1, given
by (17).
2) or the execution time of the handover is more than T ′1 =
[T1 − Ts]
+ (where [x]+ = max[0, x]) and the transmis-
sion delay of the n-th message, D′p is superior to the
transmission delay Dp of the message 0. (Fig. 8 when
n = 3).
Then, whenTb = nTs, the probability thatCEB occurs for
the first time at the k-th handover is given by:
P(CEBk) = δ(Dk≤t−Tb)
[
1−
k−1∑
i=1
P(CEBi)
]
· [P(DeH > T1) + 0.5P (T ′1 ≤ DeH ≤ T1)] . (19)
Fig. 8. Illustration of CEB when Tb = nTs.
Fig. 9. Occurrence probability of error Type B according to the relationship
between Tb and Ts. Note: Simul—Simulation approach; Anal—Analytical
approach. The relative error between two approaches is presented by percentage
numbers in the figure.
TABLE III
CHOOSING Tb ACCORDING TO Ts AND meH IN ORDER
TO LIMIT THE OCCURRENCE PROBABILITY OF CEB
Fig. 9 compares the results between the analytical approach
and the simulation approach of the occurrence probability of
the CEB (presented by the vertical axis) during a train journey
when Tb = 2Ts + 0.1 (an example for the case Tb > nTs +
To) and Tb = 3Ts (an example for the case Tb = nTs). We
find that the results of two approaches are almost the same. In
fact, the ǫr, that is presented by percentage number according to
every value point of PCEB , is not important. In the worst case,
when PCEB < 0.005, then ǫr < 5% of PCEB obtained by the
simulation approach.
Then, the analytical approach is applied to evaluate the
occurrence probability of rare events in order to consider for
which value of Tb, the impact of error Type B during a train
journey can be negligible (PCEB(1 h) ≤ 1E − 5). Hereunder
are two examples taken from Table III that has the same presen-
tation principles of Table II:
1) For Ts = 0.2 and meH = 0.05, the occurrence probabil-
ity of CEB can be negligible when Tb ≥ 1.2 s. CEB can
be negligible when Tb ≥ 1.8 s.
2) For Ts = 0.2 andmeH = 0.096, the occurrence probabil-
ity of CEB can be negligible when Tb ≥ 2 s.
3) Missing Consecutive Valid Messages for More Than Tb s
Due to the Communication Error Type C: As the connection
loss rate is 10−4/h [18], the probability that the connection loss
occurs more than 2 times during a train journey is negligible.
Therefore, FC(t) can be re-written as:
FC(t) = FW1 (t− T1)
∞∫
T1C
fDrc(u)du (20)
where T1C = [T1 − Td]+; fDrc(u) is given by (3)
FW1(t− T1) = 1− exp (−λl(t− T1)) .
Similarly to the communication error Type B, the occurrence
probability of theCEC is calculated in the following two cases:
For the first case whenTb > nTs +To,CEC occurs if the
connection time-out Doc is more than T1, that is given by (17)
when replacingDk byDl.
where Dl is the occurrence time of the l-th connection loss.
As (n− 1)Ts + To ≤ T1 < nTs + To, from (20), the occur-
rence probability of the CEC in this case is:
PCECinf
(t) ≤PCEC (t) < PCECsup (t)
PCECinf
(t) =FW1(t− Tb)
∞∫
T1Cinf
fDrc(u)du
PCECsup
(t) =FW1(t− Tb)
∞∫
T1Csup
fDrc(u)du (21)
where T1Csup = [(n− 1)Ts + To − Td]+, and T1Cinf =
[nTs + To − Td]
+
.
For the second case when Tb = nTs, similarly to error
type B, the probability thatCEC occurs during [0, t] is given by:
PCECinf
(t) ≤PCE(t) < PCECsup (t)
PCECinf
(t) =FW1(t− Tb)
[
0.5P
(
T1C′inf ≤ Drc ≤ T1Cinf
)
+P (Drc > T1Cinf )
]
PCECsup
(t) =FW1(t− Tb)
[
0.5P
(
T1C′sup ≤ Drc ≤ T1Csup
)
+P
(
Drc > T1Csup
)
]
(22)
where T1C′inf = T1Cinf − Ts and T1C′sup = T1Csup − Ts.
Fig. 10 compares the results between the analytical approach
and the simulation approach of the occurrence probability of the
CEC during a train journey, according to Tb ∈ [1, 6] s. We find
that the simulation results are between the inferior threshold
(PECCinf ) and superior threshold (PECCsup ) of the analytical
approach. Then, hereafter the probability that CE occurs due
to error type C can be approximated by:
PECC (t) =
PECCinf
(t) + PECCsup(t)
2
. (23)
The maximal value of PECC(t) during a journey is about
10−4. Hence, the occurrence probability of any hybrid commu-
nication error where one error among the two is a connection
loss, is always inferior to 10−4. Therefore, the hybrid error
where one error among the two is a connection loss can be
negligible in further works.
Fig. 10. Occurrence probability of error Type C according to the relationship
between Tb and Ts. Note: Simul—Simulation approach; Anal—Analytical
approach.
4) Missing Consecutive Valid Messages for More Than Tb s
Due to the Hybrid Error “Error Type A and Error Type B”:
In this section, we examine the cases, in which error Type A
occurs before or after the handover process, and this combina-
tion leads to missing consecutive valid messages for more than
Tb (s). It is called error Type H.
Note that for this hybrid error type, we consider that the du-
ration of handover cannot directly lead to CE as this case was
presented before. So, error type A is combined with handover
processes in order to have CEH .
Similarly to other error types, the occurrence probability of
error Type H is evaluated in two different cases linking Tb
and Ts.
For the first case when Tb > nTs +To,
• The occurrence probability of CEH , caused by the event
that one message is invalid due to error type A before
(or after) the k-th handover, is given by:
PCEH_1(k − th handover) = 2pm
· P
(
[T1 − Ts]
+ ≤ DeH < T1
)
. (24)
where pm is given by the (8) and T1 is given by the (17).
• Similarly, the occurrence probability of CEH , caused by
the event that i messages are invalid due to error type A
before (or after) the k-th handover, is given by:
PCEH_i(·) = 2pim · P
(
[T1 − i · Ts]
+ ≤ DeH
< [T1 − (i− 1)Ts]+
)
• Hence, the occurrence probability of CEH is given by:
PCEH (·) =
(n−1)∑
i=1
PCEH_i(·). (25)
We find that
PCEH_1(·)
PCEH_i(·)
=
exp (−λeH · (i − 1)Ts)
pi−1m
.
When (PCEH_1(·))/(PCEH_i(·))≫ 1, the PCEH can be
approximated by the PCEH_1 .
For the second case whenTb = nTs,
• The occurrence probability of CEH , caused by the event
that one message is invalid due to error type A before
(or after) the k-th handover, is given by:
PCEH_1(.)
= 2pm ·
(
P
(
Dp > D
′
p
)
P(T1_s1 ≤ DeH < T1)
+P
(
Dp ≤ D
′
p
)
P(T1_s2 < DeH < T1_s1)
)
= pm ·
(
P(T1_s1 ≤ DeH < T1)
+P(T1_s2 < DeH < T1_s1)
)
= pm · P(T1_s2 ≤ DeH < T1) (26)
where pm is given by (8), T1 is given by (17), and T1_si =
[T1 − i · Ts]
+
.
• Similar to the first case, the occurrence probability of
CEH could be approximatively by CEH_1.
5) Analytical Process for Evaluating the Occurrence Proba-
bility of CE During the Mission Time:
Input: Tb, Ts, To, Tm and all parameters characterized the
WCS performance (λl,λp,λeH , pf , a, b, Td, THo, TRE , pET ).
Output: Probability that CE occurs during the mission time
(Tm) of the train, PCE(Tm)
Initialisation: i = 1
1: Evaluate the probability PCE1 , that CE occurs for the first
time before the first handover.
Evaluate PCEA(t ≤ THo) by
Eq. (9) if Tb > nTs + To
Eq. (16) if Tb = nTs
Evaluate PCEC(t ≤ THo) by
Eq. (21) & Eq. (23) if Tb > nTs + To
Eq. (22) & Eq. (23) if Tb = nTs
PCE1 = PCEA(t ≤ THo) + PCEC(t ≤ THo).
LOOP Process
2: for i = 2 to int [(Tm − Tb)/THo ] do
3: Evaluate the probability P¯CE that CE does not occur yet
until the i-th handover.
P¯CEi = 1−
i−1∑
j=0
PCEj
4: Evaluate PCEA((i− 1)THo < t ≤ iTHo) by
Eq. (9) if Tb > nTs + To
Eq. (16) if Tb = nTs
5: Evaluate PCEC ((i − 1)THo < t ≤ iTHo) by
Eq. (21) if Tb > nTs + To
Eq. (22) Tb = nTs
6: Evaluate PCEB ((i− 1)THo < t ≤ iTHo) by
δ{t≥THo+Tb}P(DeH > T1) if Tb > nTs + To
δ{t≥THo+Tb} [P(DeH > T1) + 0.5P (T ′1 ≤ DeH ≤ T1)]
if Tb = nTs
7: Evaluate PCEH ((i − 1)THo < t ≤ iTHo) by
Eq. (24) if Tb > nTs + To
Eq. (26) if Tb = nTs
Fig. 11. Comparison between analytical and simulation results of PCE .
Note: Simul—Simulation approach; Anal—Analytical approach. (a) Occur-
rence probability of the CE according to Tb. (b) Relative error between
analytical and simulation results.
8: Evaluate the probability PCEi , that CE occurs for the
first time during ](i− 1)THo, iTHo].
PCEi = P¯CEi (PCEA(·) + PCEC(·) + PCEB (·) + PCEH (·))
9: end for
10: Evaluate the probability that CE occurs during the
mission time Tm
PCE(Tm) =
int
[
Tm−Tb
THo
]∑
i=1
PCEi
11: return PCE(Tm)
Fig. 11 presents the simulation results and the analytical
results for the occurrence probability of the CE during a train
journey according to Tb. We find that for the case study, the
analytical approach gives close results compared to the results
of the simulation approach [see Fig. 11(a)]. However, for the
small value of PCE (PCE ∼= 1E − 4), the relative error is
quite significant 0.2 < ǫr < 0.25 [see Fig. 11(b)] because of the
simulation approach’s defect when evaluating the small proba-
bilities. In fact, considering only 106 scenarios, the simulation
approach cannot give the results within 12 h, for example when
Ts = 0.3 s and Tb > 1.2 s. Therefore, for small probabilities,
the analytical approach is more powerful. And based on the
analytical approach result, we find that when Tb is large enough
compared to Ts, the impact of error type A, B, and H can be
negligible. For example when Ts = 0.6 s and Tb = 2 s, the
occurrence probability of the CE strictly depends on error
type C: “connection loss”, PCE(= 9.25E − 5) ≃ PCEC (=
9.27E − 5). Moreover, considering Fig. 10, the decreasing
of PCEC is not important according to Tb. Therefore, when
Tb = 2 s, it is not necessary to increase Tb in order to reduce
the occurrence probability of CE.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new analytical analysis to
evaluate the consequences on safety level of the wireless
communication errors in train control application. In detail,
three principal error types, which lead to consecutive invalid
messages, such as packet error rate, long handover execution
time, and connection loss, were analyzed. The new analytical
approach was developed to evaluate the occurrence probability
of CE: “missing invalid consecutive messages sent from the
train to the zone controller for more than Tb s”; where Tb is the
waiting time before sending an emergency braking message
from the TCC to the train behind. When comparing the new ap-
proach with the simulation approach based on a Petri net model,
we obtained the same results. Furthermore, the efficiency and
the robustness of our analytical approach were highlighted in
the cases of small probabilities of CE when the accuracy of the
simulation approach and its execution time cannot meet user
requirements due to its approximate statistic calculations.
Considering the case study of the LTE-based CBTC system,
our approach was applied to identify the appropriate threshold
of the waiting time, Tb, in order to limit the occurrence
probabilities of the CE according to every error type.
The analytical results presented in this paper constitute the
prerequisite to analyze the RAMS parameters of the WCS in
train control application. In order to ensure the desired level of
performance for the safety application (CBTC here), according
to the V-model of the product life-cycle presented in the EN
50126 standard, a new system (LTE-based communication
system in this case) is not only evaluated and tested in the
last phases after the complete development but also in the
early design phases. Indeed, following the studies of [10], [11]
corresponding to every proposed configuration (or architecture)
of the LTE-based communication system, the performance
parameters of the communication system (such as packet delay,
packet error rate, communication loss rate, etc) can be obtained
by OPNET simulation. Then, using these parameters as inputs,
the analytical approach proposed in this paper can examine
whether the studied system is able to guarantee a given level
of performance (an acceptable value of the probability of
the critical events) or not. Moreover, our analytical approach
could be applied in order to identify the appropriate values
for communication performance parameters. Therefore, it aims
to make recommendations for implementing the appropriate
architecture/configuration of the LTE based CBTC system.
On the other hand, as the assumption about exponential
distribution of delay packet and of handover execution time
is considered as limitation of our model. It should be better
to study which distribution is more appropriate to empirical
data. Note that the modification of these assumptions does not
significantly affect the proposed approach. Indeed, when con-
sidering another distribution for packet delay, such as gamma or
logistic distribution [7], we only re-evaluate the probability that
the transmission time is more than the obsolescence deadline
[in Eq. (7) of the Section III-A]. Finally, a further work could
consider distance management between trains to perform the
sensitivity analysis of the dependability and the safety parame-
ters of the TCS based on WCS.
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